When I decided to retire from engineering twelve years ago to open a bookshop, the thought of a world of gentlemen and gentlewomen engaged in intellectual discussions, in soft dulcet tones, about good books, current affairs and ideas over coffee or glasses of red wine was immensely pleasurable compared to all the argy-bargy, the barely legal (and often downright illegal) activities and the thuggery of the construction world I was leaving (despite some severe financial adjustment I had to make). About a year after I opened the doors of Silverfish Books, the invasion of the mega-bookstore in Kuala Lumpur started. With their infinitely deeper pockets, they could order every book in the list, whether they knew anything about it or not. The first half of the last decade saw the establishment of so many of these giant bookstores in the Klang Valley, that at one point we had more than twice as much book retail space here than in Singapore, an island with twice the population. Every new shopping mall insisted on a mega bookstore of its own. The most coveted name on the list was Borders, the store that had made reading sexy in Singapore where it was established in 1997. Borders was, probably, single-handedly responsible for making books hip-and-happening all over the world.
But that didn't last long. The second half of the decade saw a gradual downsizing (euphemistically called consolidation) of several chain outlets. The romance was over. Borders is gone. Barnes and Noble could be next. And Waterstone’s might be sold. So what happened? It is common to hear people blame the demise of these chain stores on the Kindle and e-books, etc, etc. Really?
Unfortunately, the truth is simpler. The book industry shot itself in its foot, and has no one to blame for it, but itself.
Book buyer fatigue
First, there was this humungous oversupply of books. Anglophone countries were churning out more than 300,000 new titles a year in UK, USA, Australia and India. A report in The Telegraph in August 2007, announcing the Booker shortlist for the year gave figures of copies sold: On Chesil Beach (Ian McEwen), over 100,000; The Reluctant Fundamentalist (Mohsin Ahmad), 1519; Mister Pip (Lloyd Jones), 880; Animal’s People (Indra Sinha), 231; The Gathering (Anne Enright), 834. (These figures were for sales just after the shortlist was announced.) It was a clear sign that book buyers were getting tired, but the industry was not listening and continued to produce books that nobody wanted.
Second, chains and supermarkets started selling books as loss leaders. Everyone knows how small the margins on books are. Supermarkets can afford loss leaders because they sell all sorts of other merchandise with high margins. When bookstores start giving away their profits on their bestsellers, however, one senses something amiss. Bestsellers are where bookstores make the profit to stock up on other titles. Most customers who go into a bookshop to buy a bestseller buy nothing else, unlike people who go to a supermarket. Amazon is able to get away with it because apart from books, it sells music CDs, videotapes and DVDs, software, consumer electronics, kitchen items, tools, lawn and garden items, toys & games, baby products, apparel, sporting goods, gourmet food, jewellery, watches, health and personal-care items, beauty products, musical instruments, industrial & scientific supplies, and groceries. (Instead of recognising this, the industry was more concerned about Amazon calling itself the 'world's largest bookshop'. Amazon is a mega hypermart, get it? The game has changed. Amazon and hypermarts reduced books to the level of soda water, and the industry went along foolishly.)
Third, the book is a monopoly. A book retailer, in most cases, is able to obtain a particular title from only one supplier, the publisher, and on the latter's terms. Period. The bookseller has no option of buying his merchandise at a lower cost from China, Vietnam, Cambodia, or manufacture it himself in one of those places, unlike hypermarts that are able to buy a garment for 15 cents and sell it for 15 dollars.
Million dollar advances
Fourth, poor management. (The internet has many examples of bad management at Borders but I shall stick to my experience.) When Borders opened its first store at the Berjaya Times Square in Kuala Lumpur in 2005, I went to over to see if they had copies of the hardback edition of Freakonomics. Their system showed three copies. I kept myself occupied with their CD collection while the sales staff went about looking for it. After forty-five minutes, they told me they couldn’t find even one copy. (Honestly, I don't know why I waited that long.) Another case: Border's Singapore used to buy Silverfish publications through my distributor there, but they used to take forever to confirm -- apparently, they had to get the approval of their office in Australia before they could buy a local book. That would take months. Meanwhile other bookstores would have the title on their shelves the same week of publishing!
Fifth, the industry believed its own spin. The last decade was the era of the million-dollar advances and billionaire writers, if you believed the hype (and many did). All one had to do was to pick up a pen (or sit in front of a word processor) to get rich. It was bizarre. I remember headlines in local dailies calling Tash Aw the 'RM3.5 million dollar man'. When I asked him about it, he was totally embarrassed. (Tash said he has never mentioned a figure, so how reporters came up with that number is anyone's guess.) The industry lived on the hyperbole. Big numbers were good. It made good stories, good copies and helped sell books. Publisher, wholesalers and distributors, retailers, the media and the consumers, all loved big numbers (even if they were blatant lies). Reports started coming out that many titles were unable even to recover advances given; still, the numbers kept going up. It was the perfect bubble.
Sixth, over-printing to wallpaper chain shops. There was a report that the first print run of a particular popular book was 35 million. Sales figures released some time later showed 10 to 12 million. What happened? Was the original figure not true? Did the publisher pulp the remainder? Or did the publisher print the additional copies for reasons other than sales? If so, who paid for it? Did they print that number of copies to meet wallpaper demands of the chain bookstores?
Selling potatoes
Seventh, books retailers had no idea what they were selling. One of the reasons given for the demise of Borders in Australia was the way they sold books like potatoes. Taking it from the top, one has to wonder how some books even get published. (The head of Random House said in an interview with Spiegel Online that he had no time to read.) So who makes publishing decisions? Agents? Then, there is the layer of wholesalers and distributors for whom potatoes, or books, makes no difference. After that, come the retailers. The book is probably the only commodity sold by people with zero product knowledge. (Independents not included.)
Eighth, everyone is now blaming the e-book. The e-book is still new. The Kindle is only three years old, and there are dozens of competitors in the market. The iPad is only a year old. Although many early adopters have downloaded ebooks, there are no real numbers to work on. How many of these books were downloaded for free? How many were paid for? At what price? The favourite number thrown about by device manufacturers is 'millions' (with no substantiation) and the media is lapping it all up and regurgitating it without question. (I have downloaded about a dozen free e-books books so far, mostly classics. Ironically, I find it more comfortable to read them on my little iPod Touch screen than on my iPad. I haven't tried a Kindle, yet.) Right now we don't even know what an e-book is. The Kindle defined one. Then the iPad turned it upside down in just a short while. Things are changing rapidly. Expect many more permutations before something firms up, still a long way to go before forms take shape and a market is established. Until then, many devices already purchased have a good chance of ending up on shelves.
Ninth, lesson not learnt from the music industry. A recent story in The Brave New World says: "... global recorded music sales fell by some USD1.5bn (GBP 930m) last year."
Will anyone learn from the music industry
"The UK music business physical sales dropped by almost 20% with the overall performance down some 11% and although digital sales continued to rise by some 20% it did not offset the equivalent loss in physical sales ..." it continues, and that US economist Joel Waldfogel does not agree with the music industry bodies and major labels that creation of new music has been hurt by piracy, and that with "... new and cheaper recording technologies, digital music outlets and social networks, many of the tasks that were previously fulfilled by the big labels could easily be taken over by independent labels, or even the artists themselves."
